



Blue Mountains Refugee Support Group

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Safety of Shias in Pakistan – April 2013

Selections from recent articles

Commentary and selections by Graeme Swincer¹ for Blue Mountains Refugee Support Group, April 2013

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Introduction and Summary

My recent paper on the dangers facing Hazaras in Pakistan (bmrsg.org.au/research-material/Pakistan/) shows conclusively that there is no safe haven for Hazaras anywhere in Pakistan. The LeJ and the Taliban and their fellow travellers (fundamentalist Sunnis who regard Shias or Shiites as infidels) are ubiquitous and mobile and continue to act with impunity in targeting Hazaras. The government seems ineffective in curbing the killings and lesser forms of persecution. Many observers are describing what is happening as genocide.

However this persecution is not restricted to Hazaras. The LeJ has openly and repeatedly vowed to exterminate all Pakistani Shias. In round figures, the population of Pakistan is approaching 200 million consisting of 160 million Sunnis and 40 million Shias. What is not obvious from these statistics is that the Shias are not simply scattered through the population as individuals, perhaps like Catholics and Anglicans (or English, Irish and Germans) might be dispersed in Australia. Rather, many of them belong to distinct and identifiable groups. The Hazaras are the most easily identifiable Shia group because of their mongoloid features. They are also vulnerable to targeted attack because, (ironically) partly for safety reasons, they tend to live in large enclaves. But there are many other Shia tribal groups who tend to live in specific locations, but whose members often move away for a variety of reasons.² These are certainly vulnerable to attack in their traditional settings, but they are hardly safer if they relocate. They are not able to hide themselves in “safe havens” because their names identify them. Identity cards must be used for almost every transaction: purchasing a travel ticket, staying at a hotel, applying for a job, enrolling in a study course, opening a bank account, renting accommodation or obtaining medical treatment. It is not possible to carry on a normal life anywhere in Pakistan without divulging Shia and “tribal” identity. Usually there is no consequent issue, but increasingly there is fear that the person noting the information may be a spy for the LeJ or another militant group. Already there are many experiences of individual Shias being targeted and mistreated by this process, but few of these are documented internationally.

Apart from the Hazaras the Shia group that is most intensely targeted is the Turis. This group of Pashtun Shias has been historically the most active in opposing the Taliban. For this reason the Taliban and their friends have persistently attacked the Turis in their home area of Kurram agency (on the north-west frontier), resulting in tens of thousands of them fleeing to other areas. Most of these internally displaced people live in “refugee” settlements where they are hardly less vulnerable. Those who try to hide in the nearest big city, Peshawar, find that they are not safe, and even in the more distant cities such as Karachi attacks on non-Hazara Shiites have been experienced in recent months. The capital, Islamabad, may seem to offer a viable option for fleeing Turis, but even there the ID card issue makes detection and persecution an ever present source of anxiety.

The following articles highlight the growing difficulties for the Shia minority in Pakistan. Selection is biased in the direction of non-Hazara groups.

Articles 2, 3 and 4 were published in the first 3 months of 2013 and therefore provide very up to date information. The other two articles are less recent but their information and perspectives remain valid.

² The Pakistani Shia community is spread across the country, mainly in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the capital Islamabad. Pakistan hosts a number of distinct Shia communities, including the Turis and Bangash Pashtun tribes, Qizilbash, Hazaras, Baltis, Shias of Padhrar, Khojas, Bohris and others. While the majority of Shia community comprises local ethnic groups like the Punjabis, Sindhis, Muhajirs, Kashmiris and few Pashtuns and Balochis, there are also many Shias of Persian-Arab descent. Pakistani Shia community also has a large [Syed](#) population. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam_in_Pakistan)

Article #1

UNHCR | Refworld | Pakistan: 1. Are there any examples of members of the Turi tribe being targeted for harm in Pakistan's major cities?

(For Refugee Review Tribunal, Australian Government)

<http://www.scoop.int/from-parachinar-the-pakistani-gaza/p/3076388511/unhcr-refworld-pakistan-1-are-there-any-examples-of-members-of-the-turi-tribe-being-targeted-for-harm-in-pakistan-s-major-cities-please-provide-recent-relevant-information-concerning-the-re?tag=pakistan>

(Question from RRT Australia)

Are there any examples of members of the Turi tribe being targeted for harm in Pakistan's major cities? Please provide recent, relevant information concerning the relocation of Shi'ite Pashtuns from FATA/NWFP³ to other parts of Pakistan.

(Response from UNHCR)

No sources have been located that state that the Shi'ite Pashtun Turis have been specifically targeted for harm outside of their home region of Kurram Agency. However, **there are reports of Shi'ite Pashtuns being specifically targeted in regions where large numbers of Turi and Bangash internally displaced persons (IDPs) have relocated.** This response therefore discusses the issue of relocation of Shi'ite Pashtuns by examining recent events in cities in Pakistan with large Pashtun and Shi'ite populations. The response also provides a brief background to the conflict that has displaced the two main Shi'ite Pashtun tribes in Pakistan, the Turi and the Bangash.

Background

The Turi are a Pashto-speaking tribe who have historically lived in the Upper Kurram Valley of Kurram Agency, Pakistan. Unlike the overwhelming majority of Pashtuns, the Turi are almost exclusively Shi'ite Muslims. A number of clans within the Bangash tribe are also Shi'ite.

The Turi have a long history of conflict with Sunni members of the Bangash tribe and, more recently, the Haqqani Network, a major faction of the Afghani Taliban.

Both the Haqqani Network and the TTP adhere to a strict Deobandi theology that is violently opposed to Shia Islam, as well as the more moderate Barelvi Islam that is practiced by the majority of Sunni Pakistanis. As a consequence of their fierce resistance to the Haqqani and the TTP, the Turi tribe have gained an international profile and have raised the ire of Deobandi militants throughout South Asia. Furthermore, large numbers of Turi have become internally displaced, with most internally displaced persons (IDPs) relocating to either the Upper Kurram headquarters of Parachinar, or the districts of Hangu and Kohat in nearby Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which have their own sizeable Pashtun Shi'ite populations.

In September and October 2010, sources report that the Haqqani Network is actively seeking a peace deal with the Turi and their two known militias, the Kurram Hizbullah and the Mahdi militia. In November 2010 it was also reported that secret talks have been held between Kurram elders, Haqqani Network senior commanders, and the TTP in Islamabad. In late November 2010 Dawn reported that these talks failed to reach a peace deal due to the Turi's refusal to allow Afghan Taliban forces to use the Thall-Parachinar road.

³ FATA = Federally Administered Tribal Areas ; NWFP = North West Frontier Province



Further complicating the situation for the Turi, and indeed for NATO objectives in Afghanistan, is the fact that the Haqqani Network has very close links with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who support the network in the hope of providing Islamabad with leverage in any post-conflict government in Kabul, which they believe will inevitably include members of the Afghan Taliban. This places the Turi at odds with the top security/intelligence organisation in the country, adding another dimension to their well-being. According to Strat for Global Intelligence, Islamabad and the ISI would prefer a peaceful settlement between the Turi and the Haqqani Network.

NB: The law in Pakistan provides for freedom of movement within the country; however, the US Department of State writes that the Pakistani government limits this right in practice.
(emphasis added)

Kohat has a large Shi'ite Pashtun minority, especially in the towns of Chikarkot Bala, Sherkot, Kachai and Usterzai Payan. Usterzai Payan reportedly has the largest Shia population in the district and is home to the Shia run Al-Asar College and a large Shia Bangash population. Other villages with Shia Bangash populations include Chiker Kot Bala, Ali Zo, Khadi Zai, Sher Kot, Usterzai Bala, Khwaja, Khizar, Jauzara, Raisan, Lodikhel, Imbrhamzi, and Kachai. Relief Web, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) information service, reported in February 2010 that Shia IDPs in Kohat were "terrified" of officially registering, with many expressing fear of venturing outdoors altogether. So strong is this fear that only 1,300 of the estimated 3,300 Shi'ite IDP families from the FATA in the district have registered for assistance. Relief Web adds that local Kohat Shi'ites believe that the presence of Shia IDPs from Kurram and Orakzai has increased their own risk of being harmed by extremists.

There is evidence to suggest that this fear is not simply a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). On 17 April 2010 an IDP camp for Shi'ites in Kacha Pakha, Kohat was hit by two suicide bombs, killing 41 people. The IDPs were reportedly standing in a registration queue when the first attack took place. According to one source, "the second suicide bomber struck minutes later when people rushed to the spot to help the injured". Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al Alami claimed responsibility for the attacks. Kacha Pakha was also hit by a suicide bomber in September 2009, in which 33 people, mostly Shi'ite Pashtuns, were killed.

Hangu is home to a large community of both Shia and Sunni Bangash. Religious affiliation among the Bangash appears to be divided along clan lines, with Alizai, Ibrahimzai, Jawz, Lodhi Khel, Marai, Mussa Khel, Raisan, Shawo, Sher Kot, and Ustarzai clans all believed to be exclusively Shia. The Hangu clan is unusual in that it is both Shia and Sunni.

Like Kohat, Hangu is also home to a large number of Sunni and Shia IDPs from the neighbouring FATA agencies. Precise demographic information on these IDPs is not available as, like their counterparts in Kohat, almost all Shia IDPs in the district are unregistered. According to a February 2010 report on behalf of IDP service providers, **Shia IDPs in Hangu strongly fear that they will be targeted for harm in Sunni dominated areas, where the majority of registration centres are based. Again, this fear is not without foundation.** *(emphasis added)*

Peshawar has been a major destination for both Shi'ite and Sunni Pashtuns fleeing conflict in the FATA and various parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (most recently Bajaur and Swat). Some of the largest IDP camps are located in the greater Peshawar area. Since anti-militant operations began in FATA agencies and Swat in 2009, people and places in Peshawar have become significant targets for terrorists.



In March 2010 the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that 40,000 IDPs who had fled FATA agencies to villages on the outskirts of Peshawar abandoned their camps after insurgents forced out of the Central FATA “began patrolling Peshawar”.

In December 2010 Turi and Bangash Shi'ite IDPs were reportedly informed by police in Peshawar that they would not be permitted to participate in the city's Ashura processions commemorating the month of Muharram. The Ashura procession is one of the important rituals for Shi'ite males; however, in the past the processions have resulted in violence between Shi'ites and Sunnis across Pakistan, and Muharram is a month of heightened tensions between the two communities. As Shi'ite Turi and Bangash have proven formidable opponents of both Afghan and Pakistan Deobandi militants, it is highly likely that the police fear that their presence in Peshawar Ashura parades heightened the risk of militant attacks on these processions. At least one attack on Ashura processions in Peshawar in December 2010 was reported in the media; Dawn reported that a grenade attack on a procession on 16 December killed a 2 year old child and injured 26 others.

The city of **Dera Ismail Khan (DIK)** in southern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has sizeable Shia Pashtun minority population and the city has also attracted a number of Shia IDPs from FATA agencies. The city has, however, witnessed a number of attacks of Shi'ite Pashtuns, perhaps as a consequence of its location close to South Waziristan, considered to be home to the largest concentration of TTP affiliated groups.

No reports have been located that state that Shi'ite Pashtun tribes and sub-clans such as the Turi and Bangash have been specifically targeted for harm in **Karachi**. **There are, however, numerous examples of both Shi'ites groups and individuals being targeted for harm for both ethnic and sectarian reasons.** (*emphasis added*)

Equally significant has been a campaign of targeted assassinations of Shi'ite professionals in the city. The authors of *The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi* argue that these assassinations are part of “a systematic campaign to target educated professionals within the Shia community – presumably in the expectation that this would lower the community's morale and encourage its members to seek emigration”.

These targeted killings of Shi'ites are likely to be linked to the large number of TTP affiliated Deobandi extremists from FATA and Swat who have reportedly found refuge in the city.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports that since 2007 three violently anti-Shia organisations, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) have all openly held public meetings in Karachi. Another, Jaish-e-Mohammed, runs a large madrasa in the Karachi suburb of Ehsanabad. It was at this madrasa that Daniel Pearl's kidnappers were arrested. The ICG reports that due to threats against Shia Imam Bara made by Sunni Imams in nearby mosques, the former president of the mosque turned it “into a fortress, with armed guards on the rooftop during Friday prayers”.

Also included in the calculus of risk to Pashtun Shi'ites relocating to Karachi is the fact that the city is now considered the primary place of hiding for senior members of the Afghanistan Taliban, who the Shi'ite Turi and Bangash have fought in Kurram. (*emphasis added*)

Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, is home to both a large Pashtun population and a large Shi'ite community. **Over the past decade Quetta has become one of the most dangerous cities in South Asia for Shi'ites and subsequently it does not constitute a safe-haven for Pashtun Shi'ites.**



The largest Shi'ite community in Quetta is the Hazara community. As a consequence of their demographic dominance of the Shi'ite community in the city, attacks and assassinations directed at Shi'ites in the city have been resulted in a high proportion of Hazaran victims.

Article #2

To be a Shia in Pakistan

16th January 2013

<http://razzita.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/to-be-shia-in-pakistan.html>

To be a Shia in Pakistan is to court death itself these days. There are literally countless stories out there like this one: <http://dawn.com/2013/01/14/a-descent-into-darkness-the-plaint-of-victims-families/> – of lives ended too soon; of sole bread-earners of countless households taken away from their families mercilessly; and for what? These atrocities are such widespread now that all of us know somebody who has been a victim of this - a victim of this insane and barbaric killing spree by dogs let loose by the State willingly.

Thousands are dead. **No city in Pakistan is safe anymore for Shias.** (*emphasis added*) This is unprecedented and unbelievable for anyone wishing for a modicum of normalcy in their daily life. How can you live this? You can't!

The recent outcry for justice following the barbaric double bombings in Quetta was heartening to see. For once, the country did wake up to the plight of the Shias. But has anything actually been done since then? Is there someone now magically willing to go after LeJ, SSP, and their friends in TTP? Meanwhile, the killings continue unabated. Two Shia doctors were killed in the space of a few hours two days ago.

The killings go on, and like everything else in Pakistan, the news fades away. It is the silence that kills. So speak up!

Article #3

Government guilty of Shia Muslim genocide in Pakistan?

Syed Zafar Mehdi

4th March 2013

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/03/04/291879/pakistan-govt-complicit-in-shia-slaughter/>

Coming down heavily on the Pakistani government, Human Rights Watch (HRW), in a statement said, "The Pakistani government's persistent failure to protect the Shia Muslim community in Pakistan from sectarian attacks by Deobandi militant groups is reprehensible and amounts to complicity in the barbaric slaughter of Pakistani citizens." (*emphasis added*)

In the killing fields of Pakistan, the bloodletting continues unabated. In a latest incident, on March 03, a massive car bombing just yards away from my sister's house in seaport city of Karachi claimed 45 lives, and left 150 others critically wounded.

My sister and her family escaped unhurt but two of her close relatives - a father and a son - were not as lucky. According to reports, terrorists struck when a large contingent of city police was busy in protocol and security duties at the engagement ceremony of Sharmila Faruqui, a provincial minister from the ruling party, and Hasham Riaz Sheikh, an aide to President Asif Ali Zardari. The car laden with 150 kilograms of explosives was parked in a Shia-dominated locality Abbas Town, between four-storey buildings, which were reduced to rubble. The dead bodies had to be taken out of the debris on a road with a 10-foot wide and four-foot deep crater.



In Karachi, people are no strangers to violence and vicious targeted killings. In Muharram last year, many people were killed while they were participating in an annual mourning procession.

In February 2010, a series of blasts claimed 18 innocent lives. In June 2009, a suicide bomber blew himself up, killing 40 people. In July 2006, a massive explosion resulted in the death of many people, including the chief of Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan, Allama Hassan Turabi.

Karachi, however, is not the only dangerous place in Pakistan, if you fit a certain stereotype. As my friend said, for those who have relatives (Shia) in Pakistan, get in touch before it's too late. (*emphasis added*) It is not a shaggy dog story. Pakistan is a bleeding nation today. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Sir Mohammad Iqbal's dream stands in tatters. It's difficult to absorb the full extent of this horror and mayhem, but certainly, silence at this point is criminal. It amounts to either complicity or cowardice.

The 40 dead in Karachi blasts included small children and women. My sister's family is not the only bereaved family in Karachi right now, and it is not the first time these families have lost their loved ones in heinous targeted attacks. It's a story of every Shiite family in Karachi, in Lahore, in Hyderabad, in Gilgit, in Parachinar, in Dera Ghazi Khan, in Dera Ismail Khan, in Jhang and in Quetta. As one Pakistani commentator wrote in his recent newspaper column, if you are a Shia in Pakistan, you are on your own.

There are heartrending tales of helplessness, of bravery, of resistance, of loyalty, of pride and of honour. Shias of Pakistan are a proud community and staunch nationalists. Like many other families in Pakistan, my sister and her family have also received threats, but they refuse to leave their country. Many families have lost their sole breadwinners, but they have not relocated anywhere. They remain loyal to their country. It is the unflinching love for Pakistan that gives them courage to walk the tightrope between life and death.

In the killing fields of Pakistan, death is a statistic. The manner in which most of these unprovoked targeted attacks are carried out bears striking similarity. Armed assailants on motorbikes close in; open the fire, and leisurely whisk away. Eye-witnesses look the other way. Police personnel patrolling the streets are conspicuously absent from duty or far from the scene of action. Sometimes, buses are stopped; passengers are offloaded, lined up in an open field, identified (as Shias or Sunnis) and executed. Imtiyaz, a young survivor of one such massacre at a place called Babu Sir that took place in August last year, is haunted by the memories of that fateful day. He recalls the day when almost 30 men, with long hair and saggy commando attire - carrying arms, ropes and knives - ambushed the bus he was travelling in. Passengers were instructed to show their Identity Cards to determine whether they were Shiite or Sunnis. Those who 'failed' the test were lined up and shot dead. Imtiyaz was lucky to survive as he hid himself under the bus, but he lost many friends in the attack.

As per an estimate, more than 20,000 Shias, and thousands of Sunni Barelvi, Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus have been killed in Pakistan since early 80s by terrorists affiliated to takfiri Deobandi school of thought. Alarmingly, not less than 30 per cent of the 20,000 Shias killed have been children and youngsters.

Meanwhile, as politicians squabble and pass the buck on where the killers are hiding and how to catch hold of them, the leaders of Lashkar e Jhangvi continue to issue ultimatums and threats to Hazara Shias. "The government should be under no illusion now that the imposition of governor's rule in Balochistan has failed to dissuade us from targeting our enemy: Shia Hazaras. We want to make it clear to the Shia Hazaras that they should not consider themselves safe and secure till the establishment of the Islamic caliphate in Pakistan," said LeJ spokesman by the name of Abu Bakar Siddiq, while making phone calls to media-persons on February 16 to claim responsibility for the Alamdar Road blast. Since then, there have been two major attacks so far.



Shias in Pakistan have listed out the demands for government. The demands include government acknowledging the atrocities against Shia Muslims as genocide, outlawing apostatizing of Shia Muslims by an Act of Parliament, and stringent action against Takfiri Deobandi militants of Lashkar e Janghvi. The issues to be addressed, as demanded by the Shia Hazaras, include holding army accountable for the law and order situation and safety of all people including Shias, strict enforcement of legal ban on Sipah-e-Sahaba that currently operates camouflaged as ASWJ, stopping the publication of threats and insinuations against Shia community in local press, financially compensating the affected families, releasing the Shia detainees implicated in bogus cases, and instituting a judicial commission, also to probe the allegations of nexus between terrorists, intelligence agencies and army.

Article #4

The Shiite Murders: Pakistan's Army of Jhangvi

Posted by Basharat Peer

10th March 2013

<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/03/the-shiite-murders-pakistans-army-of-jhangvi.html>

On the morning of February 18th, Dr. Syed Ali Haider, a forty-six-year-old eye surgeon in Lahore, was driving with his eleven-year-old son, Mustafa Haider from their home in upper-middle class Gulberg, a quiet area of mansions on tree-lined avenues, to Aitcheson College, a high school established by the British, which has groomed a few generations of Lahore élite. As Dr. Haider stopped at a traffic light, armed militants on motorbikes surrounded his car, opened fire, and sped away. His driver, who was in the back seat, escaped unhurt and called the police. The doctor had been shot six times in the head and was dead when help arrived; his son, who had been shot once in the head, died later in a hospital.

Dr. Haider came from a much-regarded Lahore family; his relatives were renowned doctors and members of the judiciary. Nobody claimed responsibility for his killing, but everyone in Lahore suspected the Sunni extremist militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which has been involved in numerous attacks on Pakistan's Shia minority. "This is a sectarian killing. Ali had no personal enmity," Justice Syed Fazal Haider, his uncle and a retired High Court Judge, told the Pakistani press.

A few days after the murders, I met Professor Osama Siddique, who had returned to teach at Lahore University of Management Sciences after getting his doctorate at Harvard Law School. Siddique's son goes to the same school as the slain boy, and told him, "I knew Mustafa. I used to teach him how to play cricket at school." Lahore had largely been unaffected by the frequent violence in Pakistan, but the new wave of attacks on the Shia minority, which constitutes around twenty per cent of Pakistan's population of a hundred and eighty million, had left the city stunned.

A sense of siege and hopelessness is engulfing the Shias of Pakistan. I travelled from Lahore to Pakistan's financial capital Karachi, where the graffiti seemed to foretell coming murders. Even in the commercial center, where sultry models advertised designer apparel on billboards, the letters "S.S.P." were painted on walls in red—for Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, the Army of the Companions of the Prophet Pakistan, the mothership of sectarian militancy in Pakistan. On my second morning in the city, the newspapers reported a "targeted attack" on Lieutenant Commander Syed Azeem Haider Kazmi of Pakistan Navy, a Shia. Kazmi was driving to work in the morning when assassins fired at him; he died a week later. Earlier, another Shia naval officer was injured after an improvised explosive device exploded beneath his car.



After 9/11, General Pervez Musharraf banned both Sunni and Shia sectarian militant groups, but it did little to ebb the violence against Shias. The legal system has been notably weak when it comes to investigations and prosecutions of sectarian violence. In the early two-thousands, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi frequently targeted Shia professionals. During Musharraf's first term in office, from 1999-2003, around six hundred Shias were killed in sectarian violence. In 2003, *The Friday Times* weekly newspaper reported that around five hundred Shia doctors had fled Pakistan in the space of a few years, after more than fifty of their colleagues were assassinated in Karachi.

By 2009, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban, a coalition of militants operating out of the tribal areas of Pakistan, was carrying out lethal bombings throughout Pakistan; several former Lashkar-e-Jhangvi leaders had assumed important positions within its ranks. And sectarian violence has intensified. "The attacks on the Shia community increased radically in the past year. As the national elections are a few months away, the militants sense a lack of political will within the political parties to go after them," a Lahore-based newspaper editor told me.

Terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi consider not only the Shias but also Pakistani Sunnis, who venerate shrines of Sufi mystics, as infidels deserving death. In the summer of 2011, Jhangvi sent an open letter to the Shia community in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Balochistan province and home to around six hundred thousand Shias from the Hazara tribe. The letter, written in Urdu and signed by the commander of Jhangvi, read:

All Shias are worthy of killing. We will rid Pakistan of [this] unclean people. Pakistan means land of the pure, and the Shias have no right to be here...

...We will make Pakistan their graveyard—their houses will be destroyed by bombs and suicide bombers.



Article #5

Shia Muslims killed in Pakistan by Sunni Islamists: singled out and murdered

Joachim de Villiers and Lee Jay Walker

Modern Tokyo Times

1st March, 2012

<http://global-security-news.com/2012/03/01/shia-muslims-killed-in-pakistan-by-sunni-islamists-singled-out-and-murdered/>

The sectarian divide in Pakistan claimed the lives of more innocent Shia Muslims who were singled out and brutally murdered. Currently it is understood that 18 Shia Muslims were killed by Sunni Islamic fanatics after having their identity checked. This brutal incident took place in Kohistan which is in northern Pakistan.

It is reported that Sunni Muslims who were traveling with fellow Shia passengers were spared death because of their religious affiliation which was shared by the brutal Sunni Muslim terrorists. This applies to the militants checking the identity cards of all the individuals and then murdering the Shia because of their “blind hatred.”

This incident highlights the reality that you have no “Muslim religious brotherhood” which is often highlighted in the West. In recent years you have had untold massacres of Shia Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other nations. The one common theme is that they are being butchered by Sunni Muslim fanatics who believe in enforcing their monoculture worldview. Also, in nations like Bahrain the Shia community is excluded from the engines of “real power” and in so-called moderate Malaysia the Shia faith is illegal.